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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
BEATRICE J. BOYLE, now
Beatrice J. Boyle Wynes,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GLEN A. BAGGS and
FREDDIE BAGGS, his wife,
Respondents and Claimants.

II

Case No.
9141

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record contains a Memorandum of Authorities submitted by respondents to the trial court. However, this present brief contains the authorities cited in the memorandum
and the arguments made therein. Reference to the memorandum in the record is, therefore, unnecessary.
There is no factual dispute. Respondents emphasize,
however, the fact that up until the time they purchased
Boyle's property there had been only one judgment or decree
docketed in the Boyle divorce - the original decree granting the wife a divorce and awarding monthly installments of
support money. When respondents purchased Boyle's property they had an attorney examine the abstract and that at-
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torney told respondents the divorce decree was a cloud on
the title. The matter was then ieferred to a second attorney
who, relying on Utah Title Sta?dard No. 26, advised respondents the divorce decree was not a cloud on the title.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Respondents will answer each of the points raised by the
appellant, viz:
1. Granting the motion to dismiss was not error.
2. A decree awarding future installments of alimony or
support money does not create a lien against the husband's
real property as monthly installments accrue.
3. The fact that res~ondents, before purchasing Boyle's
property, were advised of .,the divorce decree is immaterial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS
WAS NOT ERROR.
Re~pondents'

Motion to Dismiss -was based upon a failure
of the petition· to state a claim upon w~ich relief could be
granted. An 1affidavit accompani~d the motion; and at the
hearing on the motion the c_ourt iny.ited the appellant to present additional evidenc~.- Presumably, then, the <;ourt treated
the motion as one. for -S1Jmmary judgment. In any event, we
look to the petition filed by appell~nt to determine if, admitting the truth of all the allegations thereof, it states any
cause of action.
2
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The petition says two things: ( 1) At the time respondents
purchased the property there were unpaid installments due ·
under the Boyle divorce decree and . .these unpaid installments
were a lien on Boyle's property; and (2) respondents were
advised that the decree for future installments was a lien on
the property. Being thus put on notice, they cannot now
deny the lien.

...

If either one of these propositions is a correct statement
of the law, the petition stated a cause of action and the dismissal was error. If neither is a proper statement of law, the
petition doesn't state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Respondents do not quarrel with the cases cited by appellant
on this point. The cases undoubtedly are correct. Respondents' objection is not to the form of the petition but to its
substance. In substance, it resolves itself into an examination
of the legal correctness of the two propositions above stated.
Respondents contend both propositi~ns are incorrect and that
the petition, therefore, stated no facts permitting legal redress.
If that is true, it serves no useful purpose. to review the- cases.
Under the most liberal pleading. view-there must be some statement of a legal claim. To determine the correctness of the
court's ruling, then, we must examine Points· 2 and 3.

POINT II.
A DECREE AWARJ?ING FUTURE INSTALLMENT
OF ALIMONY OR SUPPORT MONEY DOES NOT ·
CREATE A LIEN AGAINST HUSBAND'S REAL
PROPERTY AS MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS ACCRUE.
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In considering this point we deem it proper to refer first
to Title Standard No. 26 of the Utah State Bar Association,
which provides:
"Does a judgment for future monthly installments
of alimony constitute a lien on real property of the
defendant?
"No.
"While this is true as to the usual judgment for future installments, the rule may be otherwise if the judgment is for past due installments, for a lump sum amount,
or if it specifically provides that the judgment shall
constitute a lien."
Attorneys generally have followed this standard for many
years. Some attorneys have questioned it. Mr. Paul B. Cannon of the Salt Lake County Bar wrote an article in support
of this standard in the July-September, 1949, Utah Bar Bulletin. We refer the court to this article. Admittedly, attorneys
don't make the law. The court is not bound by the title standard. Admittedly, also, there is substantial authority contrary
<'
to the rule thus announced. See the annotation cited by appellant in 50 A.L.R. 2, 651. There will be great confusion in
Utah property titles and substantial distress among the Bar
if appellant prevails and the title standard is now, after all
these years, rejected. Nonetheless, we admit that the court
can't concern itself exclusively with the immediate consequences of its rulings but is bound by the dictates of logic,
reasonableness and, when applicabl~, stare decisis.
The title standard rule is reasonable and it is logically
correct. Under our law, a judgment is a lien from the time
it is docketed (78-22-1, U.C.A., 1953). By negative inferences,
4
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if nothing is docketed there can be no lien. Now, what judgments create liens? Among other requirements, the judgment
must be for a definite and certain sum of money. See 49 C.J.S.,
Judgments, paragraph 458. In Bee~ley vs. Badger et al, 66
Utah 194, 240 Pacific 458, the court said:
". . . . That a money judgment may be a lien, it
is essential, not only that there be a valid and subsisting
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
and subject to collection by execution, but the judgment
must also be for the payment of a definite and certain
sum of meny."
Our next inquiry, then, is whether or not a decree of
divorce which provides for indefinite installments of support
money creates a lien when docketed. Clearly not, because
there is no money judgment for a sum certain. ·There is no
money judgment because as of the date of the decree nothing
is due from the father. There is no certain sum because the
installments are for an indefinite period of time. That is the
specific holding of Beesley vs. Bad!?er. The court asks itself
if the divorce decree as alleged (involving installment payments of alimony) constituted a lien on the husband's real
estate, and it answers the question thus:
"A judgment or decree awarding alimony in a gross
sum, though payable in future installments, is nevertheless definite and certain as to the sum of money to be
paid. So is a decree as to past-due and unpaid installments. In such instances the amount due and to be paid
to discharge the lien is certain and definite, and, if sought
to be enforced by execution, the amount due and unpaid
can be stated in the writ of execution. But not so as to

5
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future installments of a decree awarding alimony of a
stated sum to be paid monthly covering an indefinite
period."
We know, then, that this Boyle decree when docketed
created no lien. The next inquiry is whether or not a lien was
created automatically as installments became due and were
unpaid. This question takes us back to our original inquiry
as to what creates a lien. Liens do not arise automatically.
They arise by virtue of docketing. Nothing is docketed with
respect to unpaid installments and, therefore, no lien arises.
That, it would seem to us, is the logic of the problem. You
can't ignore the statute as to what creates a lien. You can't
create something out of nothing. If a wife wants a lien, she
must reduce the deficiency to judgment so that there is something to be docketed.
On page 17- of her brief appellants says this:
"A divorce decree awarding support money differs
from a luinp sum money judgment only in that it is payable in monthly installments. In both judgments an award
of ~oney is made to the plaintiff, which if not paid, is a
lien against any real property of the defendant. To ascertain what amou-nt is due requires a look at the calendar to see what installments have accrued under the
divorce decree and to see what interest has accrued This
is also true under an ordinary money judgment."
If our reasoning above is correct, and if Beesley vs. Badger is correct, this -statement of appellant's is patently wrong.
A divorce decree providing for installment payments of alimon~ differs from a lump sum money judgment in that in one
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case there is a sum certain to be paid, and in the other there
is not. This is the distinguishing feature. Appellant, then,
says in effect that it is easy in both cases to determine how
much is due. The difference, however, is that in the lump sum
judgment you have an immediate lien created by docketing,
and your inquiry is into the extent of the lien. In the installment alimony situation, you never have the one act that
creates the lien to begin with - the docketing of a judgment
for a definite sum.
It serves little purpose to review decisions from other
jurisdictions because the cases vary according to the particular
statutes involved. However, we might look to a few cases to
see the rationale of the courts.

In Leifert vs. Wolfer (North Dakota) 25 NW 2nd 690,
there was an award of attorney's fees and costs and monthly
installments of child support. The court startes that the decree
as to the attorney's fees and costs is a lien on the father's
property because it is a judgment for a sum certain. It then
states:
"We have noted the distinction between a judgment
for alimony in a- fixed amount and one for an undetermined amount with stated payments until changed. In
the former case there is a judgment for a specific amount
and this judgment is a lien upon real estate by statute
independent of the court's action declaring it a lien.
\Vhen there is no stated amount, but the decree requires
monthly payments before any lien attaches there must be
some judicial determination of the amount due. . . . .
"The lien defendant claims is based upon the pro-
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visions of the decree of divorce. The only lien the court
could create is a judgment lien as created by statute, and
no judgment was sought nor entered for unpaid installments of alimony. Under proper procedure it could have
entered judgment for unpaid installments and thus have
granted a judgment lien."
Again in Robinson vs. Robinson (Florida) 18 SO. 2nd
29, there was a judgment for future installments of alimony
and for attorney's fees and costs. In refusing a lien as to
delinquent alimony installments the Florida court said:
''. . .. It seems that the latter items (fees and
costs) would be governed by the law relating to garnishment after judgment, but it occurs to us that the former
does not fall in the same category.

"Allotments for permanent alimony do not become
liens when made because from their very nature they
are indeterminate and inconclusive. (Quoting case) they
may be adjusted or revised because of change in circumstances of the parties, or they may be discontinued because of remarriage of the wife or the death of one party.
Such allowances may, of course, become judgments if
after default a competent court adjudges them due and
payable, . . . . " (Parenthesis added).
Similar reasoning is found in Swanson vs. Graham et al
(Washington) 179 Pac. 2nd, 288, wherein the court quotes an
earlier W:;tshington case as follows:
"The general rule seems to be that a decree for alimony creates no lien upon the estate of the husband, in
the absence of statutes so providing, unless the decree
fastens it upon some particular property. It is a personal
8
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"Accrued judgments for unpaid alimony installments
are a basis for writs of garnishment, writs of attachment
and general executions, and may be collected through
contempt proceedings. But do such judgments, as they
accrue, become a lien on the property of the defendant?
What is it, under the statute, which creates the lien? It
is the entry of the judgment, and the extent of the lien
is limited to the amount of such judgment, plus interest
and costs. At the time a judgment providing for future
payments of alimony installments is entered, there is no
debt due. There is nothing to secure. There is nothing
for which a lien could come into being. (The situation
would be different, of course, if the judgment provided
for alimony in a lump sum.) As the installments accrue
and are unpaid, they become judgments. But such judgments do not become statutory liens. In order to create
a statutory lien there must be a judgment for a specific
amount and it must be entered. Immediately upon its
being entered, in order to secure its collection, the defendants property is encumbered. It is then impressed
with the lien."
Admittedly there is authority both ways on this· question.
It seems to us, however, that the rule of the title standard is

the one that is logical. Also, it seems to be the most reasonable
rule. As some of the courts point out, any other rule would
impose almost impossible restraints upon the alienation of real
property. Suppose the rule were as appellant would have it.
A divorced man desires to sell property and the judgment in
the divorce case shows only an award of alimony in installments. The man paid alimony for years directly to his former
9
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wife and until she remarried and moved away. The former
wife can't be located to give a release. How can he possibly
sell that property? You can't determine that there are no unpaid installments, and hence you don't know if there is a lien
or not. Possibly he could go to court and publish notice to his
missing former wife and get some sort of decree that nothing
is payable, but that is a questionable procedure that might be
subject to collateral attack. In this day of such divorce prevalence the rule sought by appellant would tie up property
so that most titles would be bad. It is reasonable to require
of a purchaser of real property that he examine the judgment
roll. To require anything more than that, however, is to impose quite frightening obligat~ons upon the purchaser. The
object of modern law should be and is to make it easy, not
difficult, to transfer titles.
Divorces are unique, and remedies are granted to the
aggrieved wife and mother that are not available to any other
creditor. Only for an alimony or support money debt can the
debtor be imprisoned. Similarly, in the normal judgment laches
cannot operate to defeat the judgment. However,
,.. laches can
excuse the payment of installments of support money. The
Utah court points this out in Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 105
Utah 574, 144 P. 2nd 528. There are many other matters that
can properly be considered in determining the amount of an
alimony or support money delinquency. For example, the
father may show that he in fact had custody of and supported
the child during the period of claimed delinquency. It doesn't
seem to make sense to encumber real property titles with the
many uncertainties attendant upon alimony quarrels. This
10
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1:

is particularly true when there is a very simple, orderly procedure available to the aggrieved wife - the re~ucing of any
delinquencies to judgment.
POINT III.
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS BEFORE PURCHASING BOYLE'S PROPERTY WERE ADVISED
OF THE DIVORCE DECREE IS IMMATERIAL.
Respondents are not certain exactly what appellant
-claims by her Point III. Apparently it is one of two things,
or both, viz:
(a) Notice of the existence of the Boyle decree before
they purchased the property put respondents on a duty of inquiry, and had they made proper inquiry they would have discovered there were unpaid installments; and
(b). Since respondents had notice of the decree they are
not bona fide purchasers for value and .hence cannot cut off
appellant's lien.
Appellant cites no authority to support her contention
and neither do we. However, the question involves the duty
of a bu~er of property. How f~r must he go in making an inquiry? The answer would seem to be that he must go far
enough into the record to determine if. there is a judgment lien
against the property being purchased. He satisfies this requirement when he examines the judgment roll to determine if
there is a judgment or decree and, if so, the nature thereof. It
is not necessary and should not be necessary that he go
beyond the judgment roll because if there is a lien it arises

~
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by virtue of the docketing in the judgment roll. Again, if
he is required to go beynd that the purchaser just can't safely
buy property in many instances. In this case, the petition
states respondents were advised that there was a judgment
lien for alimony and support money against the seller which
was a cloud on the title. The question whether or not a
particular attorney determined the judgment to be a lien
or a cloud is not important. The important inquiry is whether
or not, in fact, the judgment was a lien or a cloud. If it is
not, respondents were entitled to purchase the property free
of any lien even if every attorney in the state advised otherwise.
At page 20 of her brief appellant states that respondents
are not bona fide purchasers for value because they disregarded their counsel's advice regarding the title. Again, it
seems to us the inquiry is whether or not there was, in fact,
a lien. The injection of this thought of bona fide purchasers
into the case requires that we examine into the nature of
judgment liens. If these liens are equitable liens, an inquiry
into the bona fides of the parties is proper. The lien, how1ever, is not an equitable interest in the property. It is a
legal right. It is something that is enforced in law and not
in equity. The nature of a judgment lien is discussed in 49
C.J.S. Judgments, paragraph 455, wherein we find the following language:
" . . . the lien of a judgment does not constitute
or create an estate, interest, or right of property in
the lands which may be bound for its satisfaction; it
gives merely the right to levy on such lands to the
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exclusion of adverse interests subsequent to the judgment; . . . .
"The lien of a judgment is merely an incident
of the judgment, and may not exist independently of
the judgment; nor does the loss of the lien necessarily impair the validity of the judgment as a personal
security. The lien of a judgment creditor on real
propertyy is a legal lien and is a right as distinguished
from a remedy."
Since the lien is a legal right it is not subject to being
cut off by a bona fide purchaser. If the lien exists, it is
enforceable against the purchaser irrespective of his notice.
Our inquiry, then, is strictly an inquiry into whether or not
the lien exists. The controlling issue in this appeal, it seems
to us, is Point Number 2.
This question of notice as raised by appellant does
suggest one other possibility.
As alimony delinquencies
accrue the wife acquires a vested right to reduce the same
to judgment. Thus she acquires a vested right to acquire
a lien against the delinquent husband's property. Is it pos'sible this vested right to acquire a lien creates in her an
equitable interest in the husband's property?
To answer this question we must again consider the
nature of the lien, and-we refer again to paragraph 455, 49
C.J.S., Judgments, quoted above. Note that the lien itself
creates no "estate, interest or right of property in the lands
!which may be bound for its satisfaction . . . " If the lien
itself creates no interest in the land, how can the. right to ac13
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quire a lien create an interest? The question answers itself;
and it seems to us it also answers appellant's arguments concerning -notice.
There is perhaps one situation in which an inquiry into
If
notice to the prospective purchaser might be proper.
through misspelling of names or other error the judgment lien
is defective, the judgment creditor might properly be permitted to show the buyer had notice of the defect or notice
of _a .judgment against the seller. Of course, we don't have
that situation in our case.

CONCLUSION
Res~ndents _respectfully urge the court to follow the
rule of the title standard in this case. We feel, however, we
~are in a position to so urge not just because it is the title
standard rule and not just because it has been approved by
th~ bar generally, but because it is the logical rule. It is the
r~asonable one. It is the rule that fosters free alienation of
property. It is the rule which conforms to the greater public

gbbd.-

'
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS, ALSUP & RICHARDS
Attorneys for Respondents
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